

Homo sapiens, animal morabile

A sketch of a philosophical moral anthropology

Otfried Höffe

Philosophical ethics is primarily concerned with normative questions which are preceded by meta-ethical reflections. Yet it does not exclude empirical questions, and especially not the question as to how and why natural evolution produced a species, homo sapiens, which is probably the only known species to consist of moral beings. In order to answer this question we must call upon a philosophical discipline currently confined to the fringes of our great debates, a philosophical anthropology, and more specifically a moral anthropology.

The following reflections fall into seven sections. At the beginning I mention the skeptical objections made against such an anthropology (*Section 1*). They are followed by elements of an argument for a philosophical anthropology (*Section 2*) and considerations concerning the biological basis of morality (*Section 3*). After these, I insert an excursus on ethical naturalism (*Section 4*), point out that humans have a non-specified overdrive (*Section 5*), ask whether animals can be moral (*Section 6*) and come to a close with a provisional conclusion (*Section 7*).

1. Skepticism against Anthropology

According to a provocative phrase of the philosopher Joseph de Maistre, “man” is a fiction, a supposed general being that denies the fact that humanity is always embedded in a specific culture: “There is no man in the world. Throughout my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians and Russians ... but as concerns man, I declare never to have seen him in my life.” (See *Considérations*, 1884, 74)

Though de Maistre was a conservative, for some even reactionary intellectual, Marx and Western Marxism, presumably reluctantly, agree with him. Georg Lukács (1922, 204), an early spokesman, highlights the great danger of such an anthropological point of view which “freezes humankind into a rigid objectivity, thereby setting dialectic and history aside.” Whereas Lukács had voiced his concern before others had attempted to renewing anthropology, Max Horkheimer (1935) still held to the same critique twelve years later. And a further twenty years later, Habermas (1958/1973, 108) worries in his article “Anthropology” that “an anthropology that operates mostly ontologically, that takes as its object only the recurring and self-same aspects of humanity and human activity, becomes uncritical and in the end turns into a dogmatism with political consequences.”

One might, however, wonder quite justifiably whether these objections do not miss the point of the discussion. Protest against rigid forms of objectification had long before been raised and indeed transformed into a recurring theme in philosophical anthropology. The idea that human beings understand themselves differently depending upon their social and historical position, that they have in effect many natures, this idea can perhaps even be traced back to Antiquity and its reception in the Middle Ages. It surely can be discerned in Rousseau’s concept of perfectibility (2nd Discourse, Part 1), then in Herder and certainly in anthropology since the 1920s; Sartre (1946) will later say that, because he must make himself into what he is, the human being invents humanity. Long before Sartre – and hence before the critique of

Lukács and Horkheimer – Friedrich Nietzsche had expressed this motif in a well-rounded phrase: the human being, he says in the *Genealogy of Morals*, is “less defined than any other animal” (*Genealogy*, 3rd Essay, no. 13).

2. Concerning Method

How does a philosophical (moral-) anthropology argue? It employs a special kind of hermeneutics as method. It does not interpret specific human cultural elements, but rather empirical findings pertaining to humankind. Hence there are two ways it can precede which complement one another. On the one hand one can travel into far-off places and search for similarities that people today share with others distant both in space and time. On the other hand one can look close to home and search for that which differentiates humans from other living creatures, especially their evolutionary cousins, the primates. (For more on biological anthropology: Eibl-Eibesfeldt 2004; on comparative primate research: Paul 1998, de Waal 2005; on paleoanthropology: Diamond 1992; also Illies 2006 and Brandt 2009).

A moral anthropology that has carefully thought through its methodology does not expect to be able to replace normative ethics. Some empirical sciences, especially young disciplines, do attempt to claim that their own approaches are sufficient. But even their own argumentative logic speaks against the imperialism of some proponents of the empirical sciences. According to the undisputed is-ought fallacy, no ought can be derived from empirical claims, that is, “is-statements.” No morality can be founded upon facts alone. A moral anthropology that has carefully thought through its methodology is thus content with the more modest question as to which biological and neurobiological features establish that humans are moral beings. To this attaches the question: Why does morality have a universal basis in (biological) nature and yet is culturally determined? A third question asks: How can morality be understood as a well-founded ought, an imperative, without degenerating into a powerless ought, as Hegelians fear?

Contemporary ethics, as contemporary philosophy in general, has for the most part lost interest in anthropology. A few preliminary remarks are thus in order. Anthropology itself is old. One need only think of Plato, for example in Protagoras (320 ff.), and of Aristotle’s program of a philosophy of human concerns that encompasses ethics and politics (*Nicomachean Ethics*, I 1094b1-11).

The term “anthropology” is however surprisingly new. It is first at the end of the sixteenth century that it appears as a “doctrine of human nature.” And later still, essentially in the time of Kant, it becomes an empirical science of humanity. Of especial importance is J.G. Herder’s *Treatise on the Origin of Language* (1772/1964). I. Kant also played a significant role, with amongst others his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798). In this work he rightly sees that from a methodological point of view anthropology has an intermediate position. It is, namely, a “knowledge of the world” which can be attained neither through philosophy nor through physics, the paradigmatic empirical science of the time (*Anthropology* VIII 3 ff.). Later, after a number of specifically moral-anthropological writings from, amongst others, F. Nietzsche in, say, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887/1980), philosophical anthropology flourished between the 20s and 40s of the last century, primarily through three philosophers, Max Scheler (1928), Helmut Plessner (1928) and Arnold Gehlen (1940).

Systematically speaking, an anthropology based on biology rests upon the critique of an “idealistic tradition,” which takes Aristotle’s classic definition of humankind as logos-capable beings and rashly emphasizes the logos side, which it exaggerates into an autonomous intellect. Thus the specific character of the beings is either suppressed or degraded into no more than an expedient and hence heteronomous feature. Starting with Herder and up to Gehlen, anthropology sought a creative alternative to this

suppression in a position that went beyond the abstract alternative between autonomous intellect and heteronomous nature. Their attempt to define a new basis for human uniqueness, however, is not entirely convincing.

Inasmuch as this new interpretation does not start out from unity but rather from the other side of the alternative, nature, it is often empirically rich, but thereby at times runs risks turning into naturalism (“biologism”). Interpretative concepts such as Gehlen’s category of instinct-analogy (Instinktanalogie) are overly influenced by the biological concept of survival, and thus fall short of describing humanity’s defining features. Yet the new anthropology’s basic approach remains plausible. One can certainly explain that which makes human beings unique by first studying the characteristic features of their animal nature and from there move on to language, self-consciousness and reason, and hence to what interests us here: freedom of action and moral abilities.

Against the objection raised by some critics that humankind is defined as an ahistorical being, the new anthropology shows that human biological nature contains a dynamic process that creates not only culture in the singular, those aspects of humanity that reaches beyond the organic and natural, but culture in the plural, its historically differentiated instances. We must therefore abandon the dualistic way of thinking that sees nature here and culture over there. The natural existence of human beings might well be thoroughly shaped by culture, yet these cultural effects are always to some extent determined by organic and natural abilities. At best, anthropology discerns the skeleton of humanity, which then requires cultural and, further, individual features in order to become a tangible being made of “flesh and blood.”

Since then anthropology has gained much more experience than was available to its early 18th century and its “classical,” 20th century counterparts. But the basic question, and even the two basic answers to it, can already be found in Antiquity: human beings have reason and language and are social, more specifically political beings (see Aristotle, *Politics* I 2, also Höffe ³2006 and Höffe 2001). Of course, human beings, both as individuals and as a species, are initially only predisposed to both. Short of a specific development (evolution) accompanied by individual effort, neither the rational nor the political nature of human beings can become an actuality and flourish.

This requirement that human beings must develop themselves applies also to morality. A human being is not outright an animal morale, a moral being, but an animal morabile, and that in three respects: Human beings are capable of being moral, even called to be so, but must also become so. And so we can now provide a first answer to our third question: Because it requires effort, morality has the character of an ought – and in a more basic sense than usual. Morality does not only appear in the form of a reasoned ought, an imperative. The task of developing morality is itself subject to an imperative, a more basic imperative: Human beings, inasmuch as they are called to be moral, are summoned to grow from beings merely potentially capable of morality into beings actually so.

3. The Basic Biological Foundations of Morality

Let us turn to the question which addresses the biological basis of morality. Very early on, in myth, one of the precursors of rational thought (see Plato, *Protagoras*, 320 ff.), two characteristics appear that distinguish human beings from animals; one is a strength, the other a weakness. The weakness: Human organs and instincts are so obviously deficient that it is only slightly exaggerated to speak of the human being as a flawed being. This diagnosis, which one finds now and then, is nevertheless faulty as these deficits find ample compensation in the strength of the human intellect. So our diagnosis concludes: weak body, strong mind. In fact, however, both aspects intertwine, so that weakness turns into a strength: Organs and instincts must not be

tuned too carefully to one specific type of environment if intelligence is to have any room to develop. The correct diagnosis should not therefore speak of weak organs and defective instincts, but rather of being open to the world instead of tied to one environment and of a reflexive relation to oneself and to the world instead of a life of immediacy.

What appears at first sight to be a weakness always turns out upon closer inspection to be a strength. We must not underestimate our organs' abilities. Human beings cannot jump as can hares, nor climb like Koala bears, nor swim as can fish, and they certainly cannot fly like a bird. Yet they do possess three of those four abilities, namely running, climbing and swimming, and with the right technology they can even master flying. The newest research indicates our ancestors were such accomplished long-distance runners that they could pursue many an animal until exhaustion; the protein-rich fruit of their hunt then this enabled them to evolve larger brains. And in turn this larger brain enabled humans to survive, as they, too, were creatures of prey – and only the smartest prey can outdo their predators. This is indicated by the fact that large predators such as leopards, jaguars and pumas capture more animals with small than with large brains.

Human beings are also very capable in other respects. Human eyes are quite flexible and sensitive to light; some have not only a very fine, but an absolute ear; the tongue can perceive objects that are a fraction of a millimeter thick; and with our hands, we can as well lift heavy boulders as carry out the most delicate work of a goldsmith, a surgeon or a pianist. Human beings are thus generalists who can do just about anything and hence enjoy through their bodies the benefit of being open to the world. And this enables them, as one example, to live in the most inhospitable regions of the world.

Given the multifaceted openness of their nature, and in particular because of their unbound instincts and their variously useful organs, their intelligence and language abilities allow human beings a second level regulation, that which we traditionally call freedom of action. Human beings are able to establish a relation to the (inner and outer) conditions of their existence, and by means of this reflexive relation can become aware of these conditions, and can name and understand them. They can evaluate the conditions shaping their lives and, depending on the results of the evaluation, can attempt to appropriate these conditions and either creatively rework them or work towards fundamentally altering them. In short: human beings can act in one way or in another, and allow reasons to direct what they finally do or leave undone.

Human beings thus do not live in the present moment alone. They can retrieve experiences from their past; they can learn, experiment and invent in the present; they can use their experiences to anticipate the future and to make plans – though this also implies that they might suffer today of tomorrow's hunger and waste the happiness of the moment by worrying too much about the future.

In order to more accurately define the nature of freedom of action, anthropological findings require a conceptual and linguistic analysis, including meta-ethical reflections and considerations from the theory of action. One comment here will have to suffice. There are two moments to the relation to self and to reflexivity as concerns action. On the one hand human beings are able to act in a conscious or reflective manner; on the other hand they are able to select among multiple possibilities by recognizing some as their own. Both moments taken together indicate that human beings – regardless of their many handicaps, limits and barriers – are capable of deliberate and willing, and in this sense free, action. Freedom of action should however be understood as a comparative, not an absolute concept. For the moment of deliberation can be more or less correct, clear and complete. There are also various kinds and grades of willingness.

Even in their basic physical needs human beings display their freedom of action. Thus hunger and thirst urge us to eat and drink; but what we eat and drink and when, how often and in which surroundings we do so, how the food and drink are to be found, prepared and stored – all of that is up to us and depends upon further (esthetic, social ...) considerations. The urge to take in food and drink is not even necessary in the sense that it must absolutely be met. Be it for matters of health, beauty or asceticism, one can fast for a time, or even refuse any nourishment at all out of religious or political motives.

This multifaceted openness to the world, at which we have only hinted here, reveals a new horizon, a wide though not “specified” field. To use another metaphor, a human beings are fields which they must cultivate themselves. This task is conducted along with others, in an ordered and long-term manner, that is, as a culture. Thus human beings are social and cultural beings on account of their biological nature. They might produce various cultures, and in better or worse guises – but they can hardly live without any kind of culture (and its positive morality).

4. Excursus: Naturalism?

At this point we must ask if one could not circumvent the is-ought fallacy and ground morality (which is part of culture) in biology alone, and therefore with a mere “is.” Perhaps we could also circumvent the naturalistic fallacy, the supposed mistake of defining the concept of “good” naturalistically, of defining morality through its usefulness for life.

One side in these debates advocates a biological or ethical naturalism, the positive answer, whereas their opponents prefer the negative answer, ethical anti-naturalism. Both answers usually overlook two aspects. For one, the morality based on the findings detailed above is not a normative or critical, a “moral” morality, but merely a currently valid, positive morality. The is-ought fallacy has not been circumvented: we remain within the purview of the positive, of the “is.” For another, this positive morality remains significantly underdetermined. Because we are open to the world, we do require some kind of positive morality; the specifics of it are not, however, determined by this fact. One can understand this lack of determination as a form of tolerance towards various positive forms of morality. And in fact a kind of indifference reigns here that leaves open the possibility, even in some sense the necessity, of the other, the truly moral arguments.

When attempts are made to find a biological basis for the normative concept, they tend to employ criteria such as optimizing the quality of life. This criterion, too, leaves morality underdetermined. There is still a long way to go towards a specific moral program. In particular, the question remains open whether morality should serve the survival of the species (as is apparently often the case in nature) or that of a given culture (as with humans), or even perhaps that of its individual members. We are here confronted with three options – the species, particular cultures or individuals – between which it is difficult to decide on purely biological grounds. There is another alternative, one that is largely foreign to biological considerations: bare life (survival) or a good life. This second option does not simply expand upon the first; it can actually conflict with it.

The animal world admittedly also knows of acts that we would call heroic and altruistic had they been performed by a human being: some individuals do sacrifice themselves for others, in particular females for their offspring. Animals however perform these acts directly, without first asking if they should sacrifice themselves in the first place. This kind of behavior can be extended in two ways, both unknown to the animal world: Should I sacrifice myself for people other than my children, perhaps even for non-relatives? And: Should I remain faithful to a (e.g. religious, political or cultural) conviction even if I must make great sacrifices to do so, perhaps even laying

down my life? Even when a positive morality requires sacrifices, genuinely valid moral reasons can be found to refuse such a sacrifice, be it in individual cases or in general. Biology cannot answer such questions, for in the end they require a moral theory.

This also applies to the sophisticated naturalism advanced by the moral philosopher Philippa Foot. According to the thesis indicated in the title of her book, “Natural Goodness” (2001), “good” generally means that which is good for the members of a biological species. As with all animals, even with plants, the good consists also for humans in that which allows them to flourish: “I should prefer to say that virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of bees.” (2001, 35)

Foot is in no way claiming that humans are nothing more than bees. She is merely pointing to a semantic and biological similarity. Despite other differences, it is true for human beings just as for animals that “the good is what each species requires in order to live.” But she thereby ignores the above-mentioned distinction that animals are primarily concerned only with survival, human beings however with something more. Whereas stings help bees to survive, only one part of morality aims at survival, the rest aims at a good life. Moreover, a conflict arises of which animals know nothing: Should one attempt to simply stay alive and forego a good life, or on the contrary fulfill the obligations of that good life, but at the cost of life itself?

5. A non-specified overdrive

Let us return to the anthropological findings. Among human beings’ multiple abilities is a psychological feature, a nonspecific overdrive. The biological basis for this feature lies in a hormone, noradrenalin that increases performance. Along with intelligence, it does not determine specific ways or goals that humans must pursue – not even the two general goals of individual and collective survival. As such, this overdrive allows such human triumphs as technology and medicine, music, art and architecture, or literature, science and philosophy, but also heroic sacrifices and selfless charity.

These new possibilities are however linked to new kinds of dangers, and human beings can also go in the other direction, turning a biological strength into a weakness. This overdrive enables human beings to strive after more almost without cease: gluttony and sexual indulgence, lust for fame, power and possessions. It is also relevant, morally speaking, that human beings fight for recognition, the consequences of which can be negative such as envy, jealousy and vengeance, but also positive such as forgiveness, sympathy and charity. Humans can also fall prey to delusions of omnipotence. No other animal can desire to “be like God,” and so human beings can be ironically defined as apes who occasionally desire to be God.

It is also apparently only human beings who can, without any inhibition, cause harm to other members of their species, and even to themselves. The great apes are certainly not squeamish, for they will rip out their enemy’s fingernails, crush their testicles or tear their throat out. It seems that only human beings, however, are capable of murdering in cold blood, be it on orders, of their own initiative, or sadistically having made the act an end in itself. Here morality lodges an objection. It also justifies this objection and providing criteria for it. The human being is certainly not but a monster, as Sophocles writes. As opposed to apes, only human beings establish friendly relations with their neighbors, carry on commerce and help when catastrophe strikes. Here too morality has its place.

There is an important biological reason for morality: Without biologically pre-programmed checks, human beings must direct their overdrive and learn to operate in a productive rather than a destructive manner. To this end, they must develop into beings who do and leave undone, who live, as they choose.

6. Can animals be moral?

Whether we call it mind, reason or intelligence – the faculty that is responsible for action has an essential cultural component, one which becomes obvious when we consider how much intelligence is dependent upon language. But the reverse also holds true. Culture is to a great extent produced by intelligence. Cognitive science rightly maintains that human brains, being significantly superior to those of apes, permit us to acquire culture, implying in turn that, from an evolutionary point of view, for culture the brain is a dependent variable. We must not hereby forget that an ability to acquire culture implies that there is enormous potential in what individuals can learn themselves as well as great differences in their learning abilities. Adult apes at best reach the intelligence level of 3 to 4 year old human children.

Many animal species have notable mental and social abilities (see Tomasello 1999, de Waal 2005; Perler/Wild 2005). Already the Enlightenment writer d'Holbach (1770/1978, 629, n. 50) warned us not to underestimate the intellectual abilities of animals. And today we know that some animals can categorize the world into objects and events important for their survival. They are capable of remembering a great number of experiences and thereby foresee to some extent future states of their world.

Over the course of their domestication, cats and even more so dogs have learned to interact and communicate in many and subtle ways with human beings, that is, with members of another species. Primates appease one another through gestures or strategically trick one another over and over again. Thus a chimpanzee can pretend to not see a bush in order to pluck its berries alone after the others have moved along. Even birds such as the plover can pretend a broken wing in order to steer a predator away from their nest. A chimpanzee might hide his erection with his hand in the presence of a dominant male, and a female make a conciliatory gesture towards another in order to better snap at her.

Does such chicanery prove that chimpanzees can be moral because they can violate morality, in this case candor and honesty? It is true that these acts of duplicity are not simply goal-oriented, but are also intentional; yet they are only carried out in order to attain the desired goal. The one does not wish to provoke the dominant male, the other is playing a little game. In order to interpret this behavior as intentional acts of deceit, that is, as lying and cheating, we require one more structural element, namely, that the behavior not simply takes place, but does so *as a form of deception*.

A lie requires by definition that one intends to convince someone else of a non-truth. Doing so requires a mental ability that has not been observed even in highly developed animals. The animal must be able to combine in one thought the representation of an actual state of affairs, in this case the acts of concealing or of holding back, with the representation of a merely possible or even imagined situation: that the dominant male is convinced he has no sexual competitors, or that the threatened female is taking her competitor's gesture as a conciliatory one, thereby being duped. Lying requires mental mirroring of the type "I know that you know that I know," in this case: "I believe that you believe, that I mean the gesture so (as reconciliation ...)."

Controlled experiments show that we can explain these types of behavior as acts that animals have learned to be effective in specific situations. In order to reach their goal, animals do not need to know that their companions are acting on specific convictions. And so we are not here dealing with deception in the strict sense of pulling-the-wool-over-someone's-eyes, and there is hence no moral misdeed to speak of. What some claim to be the beginnings of morality are indeed remarkable phenomena, but they only represent a preliminary stage of morality. The same goes for the ability to remember. A moral subject, what we call a "person," has a specific ability that even primates do not possess (see Markowitsch/Welzer 2005). It is the ability to relate to one's own past and future, what one could call an "autobiographical memory."

7. A provisional conclusion

A moral anthropology that is open to experience also emphasizes other morally relevant viewpoints, such as (as already mentioned above) that human beings care about recognition, even fight for it, which results in such phenomena as envy, jealousy, resentment and revenge, but also forgiveness, sympathy or empathy, compassion, regret and shame. (On the philosophy and psychology of feelings and emotions see Döring 2002, Solomon 2004 and Wassmann 2002; on the anthropology of facial expressions see Meuter 2006.) Other human innovations are only indirectly morally relevant, e.g. the worlds of technological and medical advances, the worlds of work and play. These are worlds capable of almost limitless progress (perfectibility), and in light of which even the most intelligent chimpanzee populations have been treading water for thousands of years.

From an anthropological point of view, there are two ways morality exists for human beings: intelligence and openness to the world make morality attainable; the dangers associated with humanity's overdrive and openness to the world make it necessary. In any case, human beings are not actually moral from birth as individuals, nor have they been so from the beginning as a species.

As anthropology sees it, morality is a peculiar mix of ought, need and is. Human beings, as open but vulnerable creatures, require commitments, the goodness – and eventually the absolute goodness – of which must be tested through reason. Such tests might not be necessary, but they can hardly be put off for ever. And so it turns out that in a first step biology prepares the way for morality. Morality then takes on the specific form of a positive morality within a given culture, and so we needn't view natural endowments and cultural influences opposites. Thanks to a universal human reason this positive morality defers to a critical one, often similar to the first though redesigned.

The biological and neuro-biological nature of human beings thus offer structures within which morality can develop, and which even call it forth in order to survive. It is up to human beings, however, to develop this morality through their own powers and according to their own standards.

(For a closer examination of these issues, see Höffe 2007, primarily chapters 3-5.)

Bibliography

- Aristotle: *Politica*, edited by W. D. Ross, Oxford ³1964; *Politics*, translated by B. Jowett, in: J. Barnes (ed.) *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, 1986-2131, Princeton 1984.
- *Ethica Nicomachea*, edited by I. Bywater, Oxford 1963; *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by T. Irwin, Indianapolis 1985.
- Brandt, R. 2009: *Können Tiere denken? Ein Beitrag zur Tierphilosophie*, Frankfurt/M.
- Diamond, J. M. 1992: *The Third Chimpanzee. The Evolution and Future of the Human Animal*, New York.
- Döring, S. 2002: *Die Moralität der Gefühle*, in: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 4/2002, Berlin.
- Eibl-Eibesfeld, I. ³2004: *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens. Grundriß der Humanethologie*, München.
- Foot, Ph. 2001: *Natural Goodness*, Oxford.

- Gehlen, Arnold 1940: *Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt*, Wiesbaden ¹²1978; engl. *Man. His Nature and Place in the World*, New York 1988.
- Habermas, J. 1958: *Philosophische Anthropologie*, in: *Fischer Lexikon Philosophie*, Frankfurt/M. 18 ff.; neu abgedruckt in: ders., *Kultur und Kritik*, Frankfurt/M. 1973, 89-111.
- Herder, J. G. 1772: *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache*, herausgegeben von H. D. Irmischer, Stuttgart 1979; engl. *Treatise on the Origin of Language*, in: *Philosophical Writings*, ed. by M. N. Forster, Cambridge, 2002, 65-166.
- Höffe, O. ³2006: *Aristoteles*, München; engl. *Aristotle*, New York 2003.
- 2001: *Aristoteles' Politische Anthropologie*, in: ders., *Aristoteles. Politik (=Klassiker Auslegen Bd. 23)*, Berlin, 21-35.
- 2007: *Lebenskunst und Moral. Oder Macht Tugend glücklich?*, München 2007 (Taschenbuch 2009); engl. *Can Virtue Make Us Happy? The Art of Living and Morality*, Evanston.
- Holbach, P. H. Th. D' 1770: *Système de la nature, ou, des Loix du monde physique et du monde morale*, London; engl. *System of Nature*, translated by H. D. Robinson, New York 1970.
- Horkheimer, M. 1935: *Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie*, in: *Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. 3*, Frankfurt/M. 1988, 249-276.
- Illies, Chr. 2006: *Philosophische Anthropologie im biologischen Zeitalter. Zur Konvergenz von Moral und Natur*, Frankfurt/M.
- Kant, I. 1798: *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, in: *Kants Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe*, Berlin 1968, Bd. VII 117-334; engl. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, translated by M. Gregor, The Hague 1974.
- Lukács, G. 1922: *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. Studien über marxistische Dialektik*, Photomechanische Reproduktion, Amsterdam 1967.
- Maïstre, J. de 1814: *Considérations sur la France*, in: *Œuvres complètes. Nouvelle Edition*, Bd. 1/2, ed. by R. de Maïstre, Lyon 1884, 1-184; engl. *Considerations on France*, trans. by Richard A. Lebrun, Montreal 1974.
- Markowitsch, H.J./ Welzer, H. 2005: *Das autobiographische Gedächtnis. Hirnorganische Grundlagen und biosoziale Entwicklung*, Stuttgart.
- Meuter, N. 2006: *Anthropologie des Ausdrucks. Die Expressivität des Menschen zwischen Natur und Kultur*, München.
- Nietzsche, F. 1887: *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, München, in: *Kritische Studienausgabe*, herausgegeben von G. Colli und M. Montinari, München 1980, Bd., 5, 246-412; engl. *On the Genealogy of Morality*, translated, with an Introduction and Notes by M. Clark and A. J. Swensen, Indianapolis 1998.
- Paul, A. 1998: *Von Affen und Menschen. Verhaltensbiologie der Primaten*, Darmstadt.
- Perler, D./Wild, M. (Hrsg.) 2005: *Der Geist der Tiere. Philosophische Texte zu einer aktuellen Diskussion*, Frankfurt/M.
- Platon, Protagoras, in: *Platonis Opera*, vol. 1, New York 1995 ff., 309-362; Protagoras in: *The Collected Dialogues*, edited by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton 1961, 308-352.
- Plessner, H. 1928: *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch*, in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 4, Darmstadt.

- Rousseau, J.-J.: Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes; in: The Social Contract and the Discourses, translated by G. D. H. Cole, revised and augmented by J. H. Brumfitt and J. C. Hall, New York 1993.
- Sartre, J. P. 1946: L'existentialisme est-il un humanisme?, Paris; Existentialism and Humanism, translated by Philip Mairet, London 1963.
- Scheler, M. 1928: Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Bonn ¹⁶2005; The Human Place in the Cosmos, translated by M. Frings, Evanston.
- Solomon, R.C., ed., 2004: Thinking about Feeling. Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion, Oxford.
- Tomasello M., 1999: The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Cambridge.
- Waal, F. de 2005: Our Inner ape. A leading primatologist explains why we are who we are, New York.
- Wassmann, C. 2002: Die Macht der Emotionen. Wie Gefühle unser Denken und Handeln beeinflussen, Darmstadt.